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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem of decreasing common cause failure probability for nuclear power plant 
instrumentation and control systems  
To guarantee required level of dependability, safety and security of computer-based systems 
for critical (safety-critical, mission-critical and business-critical) applications it is used 
diversity approach. This approach implies development, choice and implementation of a 
few diverse design options of redundant channels for created system. Probability of 
common cause failure (CCF) of safety-critical systems may be essentially decreased due to 
selection and deployment of different diversity types on the assumption of maximal 
independence of redundant channels realizing software-hardware versions.  
This circumstance calls forth that a lot of international and national standards and guides 
contain the requirements to use diversity in safety-critical systems, first of all, in nuclear 
power plant (NPP) instrumentation and control systems (I&Cs) (reactor trip systems), 
aerospace on-board equipment (automatic/robot pilot, flight control systems), railway 
automatics (signalling and blocking systems), service oriented architecture (SOA)-based 
web-systems (e-science) etc. (Pullum, 2001; Wood et al., 2009; Gorbenko et al., 2009; 
Kharchenko et al., 2010; Sommerville, 2011).  
Application of the modern information and electronic technologies and component-based 
approaches to development in critical areas, on the one hand, improve reliability, 
availability, maintainability and safety characteristics of digital I&Cs. On the other hand, 
these technologies cause additional risks or so-called safety deficits. Microprocessor 
(software)-based systems are typical example in that sense. Advantages of this technology 
are well-known, however a program realization may increase CCF probability of complex 
software-based I&Cs. Software faults and design faults as a whole are the most probable 
reason of CCFs. These faults are replicated in redundant channels and cause a fatal failure of 
computer-based systems. It allows to conclude that, “fault-tolerant” system with identical 
channels may be “non-tolerant” or “not enough tolerant” to design faults. For example, 
software design faults caused more than 80% failures of computer-based rocket-space 
systems which were fatal in 1990 years (Kharchenko et al., 2003) and caused 13% 
emergencies of space systems and 22% emergencies of carrier rockets (Tarasyuk et al., 2011).  
The CCF risks may be essential for diversity-oriented or so-called multi-version systems 
(MVSs) (Kharchenko, 1999) as well if choice of version redundancy type and development 
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of channel versions are fulfilled without thorough analysis of their independence and 
assessment of real diversity degree assessed by special metrics, for example, β-factor 
(Bukowsky&Goble, 1994).  
1.2 Complex electronic components and FPGA technology for NPP I&Cs development  
An analysis of development and introduction trends of computer technologies to NPP I&Cs 
has specified a number of important aspects affecting their safety, peculiarities of 
development, update and licensing. Such trends include, among others (Yastrebenetsky, 
2004): introduction of novel complex electronic components (CECs); expanded 
nomenclature of software applied and increased effect of its quality to I&Cs safety; 
realization of novel principles and technologies in I&Cs development; advent of a large 
number of novel standards regulating the processes of I&Cs development and safety 
assessment. During recent decades the application of microprocessor techniques in NPP 
I&Cs design has substantially expanded. Microprocessors are used both in system computer 
core and in realization of intellectual peripherals – various sensors, drives and other devices 
with built-in programmable controllers.  
Another contemporary trend is dynamically growing application of programmable logic 
technologies, particularly, Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) in NPP I&Cs, onboard 
aerospace systems and other critical areas. FPGA as a kind of CECs is a convenient mean not 
only in realization of auxiliary functions of transformation and logical processing of 
information, but also in execution of basic monitoring and control functions inherent in NPP 
I&Cs. This approach in some cases is more reasonable than application of software-
controlled microprocessors (Kharchenko&Sklyar, 2008). In assessment of FPGA-based I&Cs 
it should be taken into consideration that application of this technologies somewhat levels 
the difference between hardware and software, whereas obtained solutions are an example 
of a peculiar realization of so called heterosystems – systems with “fuzzy” software-
hardware architecture and mixed execution of functions. This circumstance and other 
features of FPGA technology increase a number of diversity types and enlarge a set of 
possible diversity-oriented decisions for NPP I&Cs. 
1.3 Work related analysis 
Known works, related to the current problem and taking into account features of NPP I&C 
systems, are divided into three groups: (1) classification and analysis of version redundancy 
types and diversity-oriented decisions; (2) methods and techniques of diversity level 
assessment and evaluation of multi-version systems safety in context of CCFs; (3) multi-
version technologies of safety critical systems development. 
1. A set of diversity classification schemes (general, software and FPGA-based) was 
analyzed in (Kharchenko et al., 2009). First one is based on NUREG technical reports and 
guides, samples two-level hierarchy and includes seven main groups of version 
redundancy (Wood et al., 2009): signal diversity (different sensed reactor or process 
parameters, different physical effects, different set of sensors); equipment manufacture 
diversity (different manufacturers, different versions of design, different CEC versions, 
etc); functional diversity (different underlying mechanisms, logics, actuation means, etc); 
logic processing equipment or architecture diversity (different processing architectures, 
different component integration architectures, different communication architectures, etc); 
logic or software diversity (different algorithms, operating system, computer languages, 
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etc); design diversity (different technologies, approaches, etc); human or life cycle 
diversity (different design organizations/companies, management teams, designers, 
programmers, testers and other personnel). Software diversity types are classified in 
according with following attributes (Pullum, 2001; Volkoviy et al., 2008): life cycle models 
and processes of development (for example, V-model for main version and waterfall 
model with minimum set of processes for duplicate version); resources and means 
(different human resources, languages and notations, tools); project decisions (different 
architectures and platforms, protocols, data formats, etc). Next one FPGA-based 
classification includes the following types of diversity (Kharchenko&Sklyar, 2008; Siora et 
al., 2009): diversity of electronic elements (different electronic elements manufactures, 
technologies of production, electronic elements families, etc); diversity of CASE-tools 
(different developers, kinds and configurations of CASE-tools); diversity of projects 
development languages (different graphical scheme languages, hardware description 
languages and IP-cores); diversity of specifications (specification languages) and others.  
2. There are following methods of diversity level assessment and evaluation of MVS 
dependability and safety (Kharchenko et al, 2009). Theoretical-set and metric-oriented 
methods are based on: Eiler’s diagram for sets of version design, physical and 
interaction faults (including vulnerabilities for assessment intrusion-tolerance); matrix 
of diversity metrics for sets of different faults (individual, group and absolute faults of 
versions); calculation of diversity metrics by use of Eiler’s diagrams or other data about 
results of testing and faults of different versions. Probabilistic methods use reliability 
block-diagrams (RBDs), their modifications (survivability and safety block-diagrams), 
Markovian chains, Bayesian method, etc. Statistical methods include the following 
procedures: receiving and normalization of version fault trends using testing data; 
choice of software reliability growth model (SRGM) taking into account features of 
version development and verification processes and fitting SRGM parameters; metrics 
diversity assessment; calculation of reliability and safety indicators. Fault injection-
based assessment consists of: receiving project-oriented fault profiles; performing of 
faults injection procedure; proceeding of data and metrics diversity calculation; 
calculation of reliability and safety indicators. Expert-oriented methods use two groups 
of metrics: diversity metrics for direct assessment of versions and MVS reliability and 
safety (direct diversity metrics); indirect diversity metrics (product complexity metrics 
and process metrics); values of these metrics may be used to assess direct diversity 
metrics. Expert methods are added other techniques founded on interval mathematics-
based assessment of diversity metrics and MVS indicators, soft computing-based 
assessment (fussy logic, genetic algorithms), risk-oriented approach and so on. 
3. Multi-version technologies (MVTs) of diversity types selection and application, 
development of MVSs as a whole are based on (Siora et al., 2009; Wood et al., 2009) use of 
diversity types and strategies table, a model of multi-version life cycle (MVLC), a special 
graph of diversity types and their modifications, and procedures of diversity type and 
volume choice according with different criteria. The set of diversity strategies developed 
in the (Wood et al., 2009) consists of three families of strategies: different technologies—
Strategy A (digital vs analog), different approaches within the same technology—Strategy 
B (microprocessor vs FPGA) and different architectures within the same technology—
Strategy C (IP-based vs VHDL). Each of the strategy families is characterized by 
combinations of diversity criteria that may provide adequate mitigation of potential CCF 
vulnerabilities according with metrics determined by expert way. 
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There are a lot of examples of multi-version systems and multi-version technologies 
application in different safety critical areas. Generalized results of MVS application analysis 
are presented by matrix “types of diversity – areas of multi-version I&Cs application” in 
Table 1 (Wood et al., 2009; Kharchenko et al., 2010). 
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Table 1. Matrix “types of diversity – areas of multi-version I&Cs application” 
Types of diversity (diversity redundancy) are classified according to NUREG 6303 and 
painted by different colors. Last row of the matrix corresponds to other types of diversity. 
MVSs are used in space systems (Shuttle, ISS), aviation equipment (MC JVC, FAA FCS, 
Airbus and Boeing on-board systems), railway automatics (signaling, centralization and 
blocking systems SCB), chemical industry (CCPS), defense systems, power plants (electricity 
grid), NPPs (RTS and ESFAS), e-commerce and e-science (web-systems with diverse target 
web-services).  
1.4 Goal and structure of the chapter 
In spite of the intensive researches in area of multi-version systems and long-term 
experience of their application there are some problems of diversity approach 
implementation in context of FPGA technology application in NPP I&Cs, videlicet: 
specifying of concepts used; selection of diversity types and required volume of version 
redundancy; joint use of different diversity types taking into consideration state-of-the-art 
technologies; assessment of real diversity degree and effectiveness of MVSs, etc. Goal of the 
chapter is analysis of concepts in multi-version computing and diversity-scalable decisions 
for FPGA-based NPP I&Cs. Structure of the chapter is following. The section 2 elaborates 
the FPGA peculiarities in context of safety critical applications and evolution aspect of 
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FPGA-technology and diversity approach conformably to NPP I&Cs. The standards 
containing requirements to application of diversity approach in NPP I&Cs and key 
challenges in this area are analyzed in the section 3. The taxonomy of multi-version 
computing and models of MVSs and MVTs are represented in the section 4. General 
approach to assessment of diversity and MVS safety is described in the section 5. Features of 
FPGA-based platform RADIYTM and results of implementation of multi-version I&Cs in 
NPPs are analyzed in the section 6. Finally, the section 7 concludes the chapter and presents 
directions of future researches. 
2. An evolution of FPGA technology and diversity application in NPP I&Cs 
2.1 FPGA peculiarities in context of dependability and safety 
FPGA architecture topologically originates from channeled Gates Arrays (GA) (Altera, 
2001). In FPGA internal area a set of configurable logic units is disposed in a regular order 
with routing channels there between and I/O units at the periphery. Transistor couples, 
logic gates NAND, NOR (Simple Logic Cell), multiplexer-based logic modules, logic 
modules based on programmable Look-Up Tables (LUT) are used as configurable logic 
blocks. All those have segmented architecture of internal connections.  
System-On-Chip architecture appeared due to two factors: high level of integration 
permitting to arrange a very complicated circuit on a single crystal, and introduction of 
specialized hardcores into FPGA. Additional hardcores may be: additional Random Access 
Memory (RAM) units; JTAG interface for testing and configurating; Phase-Locked Loop 
(PLL) – frequency control system to correct timing relations of clock pulses as well as for 
generation of additional frequencies; processor cores enabling creation of devices with a 
control processor and a peripheral. 
Analysis of dependability assurance possibilities in FPGA-based systems allows to 
determine the following FPGA peculiarities (Kharchenko&Sklyar, 2008; Bobrek et al., 2009). 
1. Simplification of development and verification processes: apparatus parallelism in 
control algorithms execution and realization of different functions by different FPGA 
elements; absence of cyclical structures in FPGA projects; identity of FPGA project 
presentation to initial data; advanced testbeds and tools; verified libraries and 
Intellectual Properties (IP)- cores in FPGA development tools.  
2. There are three technologies of FPGA-projects development: development of 
graphical scheme with using of library blocks in CAD environment; development of 
software model with using of especial hardware describing languages (VHDL, 
Verilog, Java HDL, etc); development of program code for operation in environment 
of microprocessor emulators which are implemented in FPGA as IP-cores. It does 
allow increasing a number of options of different project versions and multi-version 
I&Cs.  
3. Assurance of fault-tolerance, data validation and maintainability due to use of: 
redundancy for intra- and inter-crystal levels; diversity implementation; 
reconfiguration and recovery in the case of component failures; improved means of 
diagnostic. 
4. Security assurance: FPGA reprogramming is possible only with use of especial 
equipment. Stability and survivability assurance due to: tolerance to external impacts 
(electromagnetic, climatic, radiation); possibilities of implementation of multi-step 
degradation with different types of adaptation.  
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2.2 FPGA technology application in safety-critical systems and NPP I&Cs 
Due to these peculiarities area of FPGA technology application essentially has expanded. 
We can say about a affirmative answer to question “Expansion of FPGA-technology 
application in safety-critical systems for the last decades: evolution or revolution?” It is 
confirmed by (Bakhmach et al., 2009):  
substantial increase of applying the technologies based on programmable logic (FPGA, 
CPLD, ASIC);  
FPGA technology is improved and ensures new possibilities to develop more reliable and 
effective systems; application FPGA technology for development of military (B-1B, F-16, etc) 
and civil aircraft control systems (Boeing 737, 777, AN70, 140), space control systems 
(satellites FedSat, WIRE; the Mars-vehicle Spirit), etc;  
application of FPGAs in NPP I&Cs (Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria: 1999-start, 2002 – 1000, 2006 – 
6000, 2008-2010 – more than 8000 chips every year). 
Besides, the illustration of FPGA expansion is evolution of the NPP I&Cs produced by RPC 
Radiy during 2000-2008 years (Kharchenko&Sklyar, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Application of FPGA technology in the NPP I&Cs produced by RPC Radiy 
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There are three stages of the evolution (Fig.1): from implementation of separate FPGA-based 
functions in I&Cs (signals processing (SP), control algorithms (CA), actuation signals 
formation (AS) and diagnostics (D)), stage 1, and implementation of FPGA-based CA, stage 
2, to preferred implementation of FPGA-based SP-, CA-, AS-, D- and communication 
functions, stage 3. 
Analysis of industrial application experience of FPGAs in NPP I&Cs is described in 
technical report prepared by EPRI (Naser, 2009).  
2.3 A law “negation of negation”: Stages of diversity approach implementation 
evolution in NPP I&Cs  
Interesting are the results of transformation of multi-version I&Cs for the last decades in 
context of hardware-software-FPGA technologies development. There are a few diversity 
implementation evolution stages in safety-critical NPP I&Cs, in particular, reactor trip 
systems. Analysis of these stages allows formulating (or demonstrating truth) a law 
“negation of negation” (Kharchenko et al., 2009) (Fig.2): 
- stage 1 (1970-1980s) – use of hardware (hard logic, HL)-based one-version systems and 
transition from hardware (HW)-based systems with identical subsystems to systems 
with hardware (HL)-based primary subsystem and software (microprocessor, MP)-
based secondary subsystem; it was the first “negation”; 
- stage 2 (1990s) – use of primary and secondary subsystems with software (SW) diversity 
(I&C platforms produced by Siemens, WH and other companies); example of multi-
version systems with software diversity is two-version system consisting of subsystems 
developed using microprocessors Intel and Motorola (languages C and Ada); it 
completed the first cycle of “negation of negation”; 
- stage 3 (2000s, first half) – transition to FPGA-based primary and software-based 
secondary subsystems with equipment, design and software diversity (first generation 
of the I&C platforms produced by RPC Radiy); it was next “negation”; 
- stage 4 (2000s, second half) – application of FPGA-oriented soft processors for primary 
subsystem and FPGA project developed using HDL-oriented language (hard logic) for 
creation of secondary subsystem (next generation of the I&C platform produced by 
RPC Radiy); it completed the second cycle of “negation of negation”; 
- stage 5 (beginning of 2010s) – application of different FPGAs (hard logic) produced by 
different manufacturers (and other types of diversity) for primary and secondary 
subsystems correspondingly; it is next “negation”. 
What will be the next step? Probably, advancement of electronic technologies, in particular, 
nanotechnologies, naturally dependable, safe and secure chips will create new perspectives 
and possibilities for development of diversity-oriented decisions. Actel, Altera and others 
companies inform about creating first chips called nano FPGAs allowing to develop fault-
tolerant projects using large-scale means. 
3. Normative base and key challenges connected with diversity application in 
NPP I&Cs  
3.1 Analysis of diversity related standards 
There are the following standards and guides contained requirements to diversity: 
- IEC 61513: 2001. NPPs - I&Cs important to safety – general requirements for systems; 
- IEC 60880: 2006. NPPs - I&Cs important to safety - SW aspects for computer-based 
systems performing category A functions; 
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- IAEA NS-G-1.3: 2002. I&Cs important to safety in NPPs; 
- IEEE std.7-4.3.2:1993. IEEE standard criteria for digital computers in safety systems of 
NPPs; 
 
 
Fig. 2. Stages of diversity approach implementation evolution in safety-critical NPP I&Cs 
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- NUREG/CR-6303:1993. Method for Performing Diversity and Defense-in-Depth 
Analyses of Reactor Protection Systems; 
- DI&C-ISG-02, Diversity and Defense-in-Depth Issues, Interim Staff Guidance, BTP 7-19, 
Guidance for Evaluation of D&DiD In Digital I&C Systems (USA); 
- NP 306.5.02/3.035: 2000. Requirement on nuclear and radiation safety to I&Cs 
important to safety in NPPs (Ukraine), etc. 
These standards contain general requirements concerning: systems which must/should be 
developed using diversity approach (Reactor Trip Systems); types of diversity used to 
develop NPP I&Cs and to decrease CCF probability; features of diversity implementation, 
determination of types and volume of diversity; assessment (justification) of real level of 
diversity in developed systems; drawbacks and benefits connected with the use of 
diversity. 
The standards are not enough detailed to make all necessary decisions concerning 
diversity. It’s important to develop additional detailed techniques of assessing diversity 
and choosing optimal kinds and volume of diversity according to criterion “safety-
reliability-cost”. 
3.2 Key challenges 
Main conclusions concerning FPGA-based MVS development and implementation 
experience are the following:  
FPGA-based multi-version I&Cs are used in NPPs during 6-8 last years, i.e. these systems 
are new object of analysis and still more unique one;  
FPGA technology gives additional possibilities to develop MVSs and ensure high safety and 
reliability;  
processes of FPGA project development are similar to processes of SW-based  
project development. FPGA project product is similar to HW-based project product (hard 
logic);  
there are not any international standards determined requirements to use of diversity for 
I&Cs development and application taking into account FPGA features. 
Results of comparative analysis of challenges caused by development and application of 
software- and FPGA-based multi-version systems are presented in Table 2. 
4. Main concepts and models of multi-version computing 
4.1 Taxonomy scheme of multi-version computing 
A set of concepts concerning diversity may be united by general term “multi-version 
computing” on the analogy with “dependable computing” (Avižienis et al., 2004). Multi-
version computing is a type of dependable computing organization based on use of 
diversity approach. Taxonomy scheme of multi-version computing developed taking into 
consideration concepts in this area described in international standards includes the 
following elements (Kharchenko et al, 2009) (Fig.3). 
Version is an option of the different realization of identical task (by use software, 
hardware or FPGA-based products and life cycle processes); identical versions of 
structure redundancy-based system are trivial. Version redundancy (VR) is a type of 
product and process redundancy allowing to create different (non-trivial) versions; 
product VR is realized jointly with structure, time and other types of non-version 
redundancy. 
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Challenges Software-based multi-version I&C 
FPGA-based 
multi-version I&C 
Detailed 
standards 
There are standards determining 
general requirements to use of 
diversity 
There are no special 
standards 
Experience of 
development and  
operation 
More 20 years 6-8 years 
Trustworthiness 
of diversity 
assessment 
Methods of expert-based, metrical 
assessment, probabilistic methods 
using SRGMs 
Methods of expert-based, 
metrical, probabilistic (RBD), 
deterministic methods 
Development of 
MVSs 
Choice of diversity kinds, generation 
of really diverse software versions 
Number of diversity kinds 
increases 
Verification of 
MVSs 
Verification activities volume are 
significantly increased 
Verification is more simple 
due to simplifying of version 
verification 
Table 3. Key challenges for software-based and FPGA-based MVSs 
 
 
Fig. 3. Taxonomy scheme of multi-version computing 
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technology (MVT) is set of the interconnected rules and design actions in which in 
accordance with МV strategy a few versions-processes leading to development of two or 
more intermediate or end-products are used; thus for development of MVS should be used 
МVТ, for development one-version systems can be used both multi-version and one-version 
technology. 
Multi-version project (MVP) is a project in which the multi-version technology is applied 
(version redundancy of processes is used) leading to creation of one- or multi-version 
system (realization of version redundancy of products). Strategy of diversity (MV) is a 
collection of general criteria and rules defining principles of formation and selection of 
version redundancy types and volume or/and choice of MVTs. Besides, important elements 
of multi-version computing are concepts “multi-version life cycle”, “diversity metric”. More 
detailed interpretation of these concepts will be done below. 
4.2 Diversity type classification schemes 
Different variants of diversity type classifications were described above. The analysis of the 
considered classifications allows approving that: 
- they are presented by classifications of mixed facet-hierarchical or matrix (network) 
types; 
- the NUREG-based classification presented in (Wood et al., 2009) is the most detailed 
and systematic, though the principle of attributes orthogonality is not sustained in full 
in it; for example, subsets of design and software, functional and signal version 
redundancy are crossed and dependent; 
- variety of product (system, hardware and software components) and of process 
(technologies of development, testing and maintenance) version redundancy cause 
complexity of VR selection and MVS development. 
More general diversity type classification scheme is so-called “cube” of diversity described 
by matrix MVR = vrijk in three-dimensional space (Fig. 4). The scheme has coordinates: 
stage of LC (i); level of project decisions (PD, j) and type of VR (project decision).  
Example of two-space matrix presented a cut of “cube” for FPGA-based systems is shown 
on the table 3. This table contains variants of joint application of one or two diversity types 
(items 1.4.2-1.4.4, 2.3.3-2.3.8, 3.3.3-3.3.8, 4.2.4-4.2.15; for example, last combinations 
correspond to 12 = 4 (kinds of EE diversity) х 3 (kinds of CASE-tool diversity) couples).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Cube” of diversity-oriented decisions 
…
…
Type of VR (PD)
LC stage  
PD levels
vrijk
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Stages of FPGA-
based I&C life 
cycle 
Kinds of version redundancy
1 Diversity of
electronic 
elements (EE) 
2 Diversity of  
CASE-tools  
3 Diversity of
project development 
languages 
4 Diversity of 
scheme 
specification (SS) 
1 Development 
of block-
diagrams 
according with 
signal formation 
algorithms 
 
1.2.1 Different develo-
pers of CASE-tools 
1.2.2 Different CASE-
tools kinds 
1.2.3 Different CASE-
tools configurations
 
1.4.1 Different SSs 
1.4.2-1.4.4 Combi-
nation of couples 
of diverse CASE-
tools and SSs  
2 Development 
of program 
models of signal 
formation 
algorithms in 
CASE-tools 
environment 
 
2.2.1 Different deve-
lopers of CASE-tools 
2.2.2 Different CASE-
tools kinds 
 2.2.3 Different CASE-  
tools configurations 
2.3.1 Joint use of
graphical scheme 
language and HDL  
2.3.2 Different HDLs
2.3.3-2.3.8 Combi-
nation of diverse 
CASE-tools and 
HDLs
 
3 Integration of 
program models 
of signal 
formation 
algorithms in 
CASE-tools 
environment 
 
3.2.1 Different deve-
lopers of CASE-tools 
3.2.2 Different CASE-
tools kinds 
3.2.3 Different CASE-
tools configurations 
3.3.1 Joint use of
graphical schemes 
and HDL  
3.3.2 Different HDLs
3.3.3 – 3.3.8 Combi-
nation of couples of 
diverse CASE-tools 
and HDLs 
 
4 
Implementation 
of integrated 
program model 
in FPGA 
4.1 Different
manufacturers 
of EEs  
4.2 Different 
technologies of 
EEs production
4.3 Different 
families of EEs 
4.4 Different 
EEs of family
4.2.1 Different deve-
lopers of CASE-tools 
4.2.2 Different CASE-
tools kinds 
4.2.3 Different CASE-
tools configurations 
4.2.4-4.2.15 Combina-
tion of diverse CASE-
tools and EEs 
  
Table 2. Matrix of diversity-oriented FPGA-based decisions 
4.3 Models multi-version systems  
One-version W(1) and multi-version W(n) systems are defined by 4 and 6 variables 
(Kharchenko et al., 2010): 
 W(1) = {X, Y, Z. Ф}, (1) 
 W(n) = {X, Y, Z. Ф, V, }, (2) 
where X, Y, Z – sets of input signals, internal conditions (states) and output signals 
correspondingly; Ф = {i, i=1, ..., a} – a set of I&C functions (for examples, actuation 
functions or algorithms of reactor trip system); V = {vj, j=1, ..., n} – a set of versions with 
output signals Z1,…, Zn (or signals Zid , d = 1,…, ni; ni is a number of versions for function i; 
i ~ vj= { vij, j =1,...,ni});  = {s, s=1, ..., в} – mapping Zi Z. 
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If the function i is performed, local mapping is true: s:{zi(vi1),..., zi(
iin
v )} (S)iZ . Taking 
into account formulas (1) and (2), multi-version system and one-version system are 
connected by relationship: 
 W(n) = {W(1), V,  }. (3) 
System W(1) may be structure-redundant and contain usual means  for signals processing 
from identical channels (versions). In this case card V=1. For system W(n) is true that: 
j= 1,a : j: ni>1. 
Mapping s is generally described by: a subset of versions vsvj for receiving output signal 
Zi; a vector st

 of version vij initialization time ( st

= {t(vi1),..., (
iin
v )}); a mean of transforming 
s values zi(vi1),..., zi(
iin
v ) in output signal SiZ . Hence,  
s:s = { vs, st

, s} and (S)iZ =s [zi(vij), st

], vijvs. 
There are the following means of transforming s: (a) the conjunctive, when SiZ =Vzi(vij); (b) 
the time conjunctive, when SiZ =Vzi(vij)ij , where ij=1, if t=t(vij), and if not ij=0; (c) the 
majority, when SiZ =М[zi(vij)], where М is a majority function k out of l (or k out of n); (d) the 
majority-weighted, when weights of versions (vij) are additionally defined on majorization; 
(e) the functional, when SiZ =f[zi(vij)], where f - some function of transforming output signals 
of every version. 
The model (2) describes system with n versions that, i
i 1
n n
a

 . This model does not take 
into account the possibility of applying several diversity kinds. A set of version redundancy 
kinds R={rd, d=1,..., m} may be decomposed on subsets for versions of products vprd(tj) and 
processes vprc(tj): R=(
j
 Rprdj)   (
j
 Rprcj), where Rprdj and Rprcj – appropriate subsets. 
Thus, different diversity kinds, rR, are accumulated in final versions of a multi-version 
system. It is described by special mapping  : R  V. Mapping  may be presented by 
Boolean matrix dj, d = 1,m; j = 1,n , where dj =1, if diversity kind rp is used in version 
vj, and if not dj = 0. Then multi-version system W(n,m) or multi-diversion system is 
described by formula: 
 W(n,m) = { X, Y, Z, Ф, V, , R,  } = {W(n), R, } = {W(1), V, ,R,  }. (4) 
It is important to describe correspondence between a set of versions V and a set of 
redundant channels С={cq, q=1,...,l}. This correspondence may be defined by mapping 
Q:V C. This mapping is presented by Boolean matrix Q = jg, d = 1,m , g = 1, l , where 
gj = 1, if version vi is realized by channel cj, and if not gj = 0. Then model of multi-version 
(multi-diversion) system is the following: 
 W(n,m,l) = { X, Y, Z, Ф, V, , R, , С, Q }= { W(n,m), С, Q }. (5) 
MVSs with temporal redundancy and р iterations of algorithms are indicated as W(n,m,n,р) 
dividing number of parallel (structural) versions nc, and sequential versions realized by 
using one channel. Set Х may be decomposed for different versions if 
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Х = j
j
X , j1j2 1,n ,  j1j2: j1 j2X X , j1 j2X X =. 
Such MVSs are called multi-version systems with naturally divided input alphabet: 
 WNХ = { {Хj}, Y, Z, Ф, V, , R, , С, Q}. (6) 
If versions process data presented in different notations, such MVSs are called multi-version 
systems with artificially divided input alphabet WAХ. A special function-transformer Пх 
(Пхj) should be specified in addition to alphabet Х : 
 WNХ = {X, {Пхj}, Y, Z, Ф, V, , R, , С, Q}. (7) 
 
 
1
C  , 2C  - the first and the second versions of a monitoring automaton; 
1
U  , 2U  - the first and the second versions of a contril automaton; 
d C , d U , d  - solver for union of two versions results. 
Fig. 5. Architecture variants of two-version I&C systems 
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Besides, I&Cs performing safety-critical functions may be represented by a composition of 
two interconnected subsystems – monitoring (checking) subsystem and control subsystem 
(monitoring and control automata). Monitoring automaton C analyses output signals X 
from monitoring and control object (MCO) and forms its status code ZC. 
Control automaton U forms control signals Z in accordance with signals ZC. Several options 
of MVS architectures are possible for a FPGA-based I&Cs. Those options may be classified 
according with such attributes (see Fig. 5): 
degree of diversity coverage (I&Cs with a full F and partial P diversity); 
diversity depth (I&Cs with a common O and separate S diversity); it should be noted that 
this feature is applicable only to full system diversity. 
4.4 Models of multi-version life cycle and technology  
A model of MVS life cycle (or multi-version LC model) is based on operations of version 
generation G, aggregation and selection U at various stages (Kharchenko et al., 2007). 
Example of the two-version life cycle model is shown on Fig. 6 taking to account some 
FPGA-oriented design features (Vij are different versions obtained on different stage of 
development) (Prokhorova et al., 2008).  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. FPGA-system multi-version life cycle 
In general case I&C system LC is a sequence of N stages. At each i-th stage of a multi-version 
I&C system LC Mi of diversity types may be applied. From Mi, i = 1,...,N; diversity types only 
a single j-th type, j = 1,...,Mi, may be selected. Besides, at each i-th stage of LC a single-version 
development technology may be selected. Each j-th diversity type at each i-th LC stage is 
characterized by two indices: diversity metrics (depth) dij and cost of respective diversity type 
application (cost increase as compared to single-version option of each i-th LC stage).  
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Thus, a set of solutions on selection of diversity kind is described by two matrices: diversity 
metrics values D =  dij  and cost values С =  сij . Hence MVS LC may be presented as a 
bipolar N-level graph (Fig.7) called graph of multi-version technologies (Sklyar 
&Kharchenko, 2007). MVT corresponds to non-zero way in this graph.  
Algorithms of MVT (optimal way in the graph) selection according with criteria “diversity 
(safety)-reliability-cost” are described in (Kharchenko&Sklyar, 2008). 
 
 
Fig. 7. Graph of MVTs 
5. Assessment of multi-version FPGA-based systems safety  
5.1 General approach to assessment 
Assessment of diversity level and MVS safety is based on the following basic procedures 
analysis and evaluation: 
- check-list-based analysis of applicable diversity types (CLD); initial data for the CLD 
analysis are I&C design and documentation, a table of diversity types (subtypes) was 
developed in advance; a result of the CLD analysis is a formalized structured 
information about used diversity types and subtypes in analyzed I&C system; 
- metric-based assessment of diversity (MAD); initial data for the MAD procedure are 
results of the CLD analysis and values of metrics and weight coefficients for diversity 
types (subtypes) used in I&C systems; a result of the MAD assessment is a value of 
general diversity metric; 
- Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) and Markovian model (MM)-based assessment taking 
into account results of MAD.  
5.2 Stages of assessment 
The main stages and operations of diversity analysis and MVS assessment depend on the 
type of the evaluated system. The first stage is a Check-list-based analysis of MVS design 
and documentation. This stage contains two operations: 
1. Analysis of I&C specification and requirements to system, definition of system safety 
class; requirements to diversity (necessary for diversity application); 
2. Analysis of I&C design and development process that involves activities: (a) 
identification of MVS types: which of the subsystems are FPGA-based and which are 
software and microprocessor-based; (b) identification of product diversity; for FPGA-
based MVSs: manufacturer of chips; FPGA technology; FPGA families; FPGA chips, 
languages; tools, etc); (c) identification of process diversity kinds. 
1
dij,сij
0,0
2 i N
0,0 0,0 0,0
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Results of analysis are entered in a check-list in accordance with rule Yes (if corresponding 
diversity type is used in a system) / No (in opposite case) and is presented as a n-bit 
Boolean vector. 
The second stage is a metric-based assessment of diversity. This stage contains two 
operations: 
1. Determination of metric values for different types of applied diversity, i.e. performing 
two activities: (a) determination of metric values (local diversity metrics μi for diversity 
type di and local diversity metrics μij for diversity subtype dij); the metric values may be 
predefined; (b) correction of metric values in accordance with development and 
operation experience. 
2. Calculation of general diversity metric μ for a system: (a) determination (correction) of 
weight coefficients ωi (ωij) of metrics (taking into account multi-diversity aspect); sum of 
weight coefficients ωi (ωij) is equal 1; (b) convolution (additive or more complex) of 
metrics and calculating value of general diversity metric μ = Σ ωi Σ ωij μij, i = 1,…, n; j = 
1,…ni. 
Thus, result of this stage is a value of general diversity metric μ, which is some 
approximation of , and can characterize the diversity effect on CCF probability. 
The third stage is a probabilistic RBD- or MM-based (RDM) assessment of MVS reliability 
and safety. Initial data for the RDM procedure are I&C design and documentation, results of 
the CLD and MAD analysis; results of the RDM procedure are values of safety and 
dependability indicators. Detailed description of the RDM procedure is given in 
(Kharchenko et al., 2004).  
6. Implementation of FPGA-based safety-critical NPP I&Cs 
6.1 General description of the FPGA-based RADIY
TM
 platform 
The platform RADIYTM produced by RPC Radiy is an example of a dependable and scalable 
FPGA-based I&C platform ensuring possibility of development of multi-version systems. 
Dependability assurance feature of the I&C platform RADIYTM is multi-diversity 
implementation through the following diversity types: equipment diversity is provided by 
different electronic components, different programmable components (FPGAs and 
microcontrollers) and different schemes of units; software diversity is provided by different 
programming languages and different tools for development and verification; life cycle 
(human) diversity is provided by different teams of developers. 
Scalability of the I&C platform RADIYTM permits to produce different types of safety-
critical systems without essential changing of hardware and software components. The 
I&C platform RADIYTM provides the following types of scalability: scalability of system 
functions types, volume and peculiarities by changing quantity and quality of sensors, 
actuators, input/output signals and control algorithms; scalability of dependability 
(safety integrity) by changing a number of redundant channel, tiers, diagnostic and 
reconfiguration procedures; scalability of diversity by changing types, depth and criteria 
of diversity choice. 
The FPGA-based I&C RADIYTM platform comprises both upper and lower levels 
(Kharchenko&Sklyar, 2008). The upper level has been created on purchased IBM-compatible 
industrial workstations. The software for the upper level RADIYTM platform was developed 
by RPC Radiy and is loaded on the workstations. The functions of the upper level 
workstations are the following: receipt of process and diagnostic information; creation of 
www.intechopen.com
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
44
man-machine interface in the Control Room; display of process information on each of the 
control algorithms relating to control action executed by I&C system components; display of 
diagnostic information on failures of I&C system components; registration, archiving and 
visualization of process and diagnostic information. 
The lower level of the RADIYTM platform consists of standard cabinets including standard 
functional modules blocks). The RADIYTM platform comprises the following standard 
cabinets (Bakmach et al., 2009): 
- Normalizing Converters Cabinets performs inputting and processing of discrete and 
analog signals as well as feeding sensors; 
- Signal Forming Cabinets performs inputting and processing of discrete and analog 
signals, processing of control algorithms, and formation of output control signals; 
- Cross Output Cabinets receives signals from three control channels (signal formation 
cabinets) and forms output signals by “two out of three” mode; 
- Remote Control Cabinets controls 24 actuators on the basis of Control Room signals, 
automatic adjustment signals and interlocks from signal formation cabinets; 
- Signalling Cabinets forms control signals for process annunciation panel at Control 
Room and others. 
The platform includes the following main modules: chassis and backplanes; power supply 
modules; analog input modules; normalizing converter modules, thermocouples; 
normalizing converter modules, resistive temperature detector; discrete input  
modules; discrete information input modules, pulse; potential signals input modules,  
high voltage; protection signal forming modules (logic modules); analog output modules, 
voltage; analog output modules, current; discrete output modules; potential signal  
output modules; solid-state output modules; relay output modules; actuator control 
modules; fiber optic communication modules; system diagnostic modules; fan cooling 
modules etc. 
6.2 Opportunites of the RADIY
TM
 platform  
Application of the RADIYTM platform with the use of FPGA technology provides the 
following opportunities: 
- to implement control and other safety-critical functions in the form of FPGA with 
implemented electronic design, without software; 
- to use software only for diagnostics, archiving, signal processing, data reception and 
transfer between I&C systems components; failures of those functions do not affect 
execution of basic I&C systems control functions, and an operation system is not 
applied at I&C systems lower levels; 
- to process parallel of all control algorithms within one cycle, thus ensuring high 
performance of the system (for instance, a processing cycle of Reactor Trip System is 20 
ms) and proven determined temporal characteristics; 
- to develop the software-hardware platform in such a way that it becomes a universal 
interface to create I&C systems for any type of reactors; 
- to assure high reliability and availability due to the application of industrial 
components as well as using the principles of redundancy, independency, single failure 
criterion, and diversity;  
- to modify the I&C system after commissioning in a quite simple manner, including 
algorithm alterations, without any interference in I&C systems’ hardware structure; 
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- to reduce by more than 10 times the number of contact and terminal connections which 
cause many operational failures of equipment on account of the wide use of integrated 
solutions and fiber optic communication lines, etc. 
6.3 Licensing of the RADIY
TM
 platform 
The RADIYTM platform has been licensed for NPP application in Ukraine and in Bulgaria. 
The main idea for licensing FPGA-based NPP I&C systems lays in consideration of FPGA-
chip as hardware and FPGA electronic design as a special kind of software with specific 
development and verification stages (Siora et al., 2009b). 
Qualification tests of FPGA-based hardware in accordance with International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard requirements include: radiation exposure 
withstand qualification; environmental (climatic) qualification; seismic and mechanical 
impacts qualification; electromagnetic compatibility qualification. Results of qualification 
tests confirmed FPGA-based hardware compliance with IEC safety requirements. 
FPGA electronic design has a V-shape life cycle in accordance with requirements of 
standard IEC 62566 “NPP – I&C important to safety – Selection and use of complex 
electronic components for systems performing category A functions”. 
The safety assessments have been conducted by Ukrainian State Scientific Technical Centre 
on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (SSTC NRS), which is the supporting organization of 
Ukrainian Regulatory Authority. Experts of SSTC NRS have considerable experience in the 
area of FPGA-based systems safety assessment, as they have performed reviews of all thirty 
three FPGA-based safety systems supplied to Ukrainian NPP units since 2003. 
6.4 Implementation of the RADIY
TM
 platform-based I&Cs in NPPs 
The RADIYTM platform has been applied to the following NPP I&Cs systems which perform 
reactor control and protection functions:  
Reactor Trip System (RTS); these I&Cs were developed as two-version systems consisting of 
two triple module redundant subsystems; 
Reactor Power Control and Limitation System; Engineering Safety Features Actuation 
System (ESFAS); Control Rods Actuation System; Automatic Regulation, Monitoring, 
Control, and Protection System for Research Reactors; these I&Cs were developed as one-
version systems consisting of triple module redundant subsystems. 
The first commissioning of the RADIYTM platform was done in 2003 for Ukrainian NPP unit 
Zaporozhe-1. In seven years since that time, more than 50 applications of RPC Radiy 
systems have been installed in 17 nuclear power units in Ukraine and Bulgaria. These 
systems are commissioned in pressurized water reactor (PWR) plants known as “VVER” 
reactors developed by design companies of the former Soviet Union. VVER reactors are 
used in Armenia, Bulgaria, China, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, India, Iran, Russia, 
Slovakia, and Ukraine. 
The largest project realized by RPC Radiy is the modernization of six ESFASs for Bulgarian 
NPP Kozloduy (three ESFASs for Kozloduy-Unit 5 and three ESFASs for Kozloduy-Unit 6).  
7. Conclusion 
Development and implementation of multi-version FPGA-based systems is new stage of 
evolution in area of improving safety of NPP I&Cs. In this chapter we discussed basic 
concepts of diversity as a key approach to decreasing probability of common cause failure of 
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safety-critical I&Cs and the taxonomic scheme of multi-version computing as a part of 
dependable, safe and secure computing.  
Known version redundancy classification schemes were generalized in three-space matrix 
(“cube of diversity”) taking into account features of FPGA technology. It is unique 
technology allows to simplify NPP I&C development and verification, realize multi-
reconfiguration (dynamical function- and dependability-oriented architecting, multi-
parametrical space-structural adaptation, etc.), to propose decisions with different product-
process version redundancy. 
Key challenges related to diversity-oriented and FPGA-based systems are the following: 
existing standards are not enough detailed to make all necessary decisions concerning 
diversity (all the more FPGA-based decisions); multi-version I&Cs are still unique, failures 
occurred rarely and information about failures is not enough representative and accessible; 
methods of diversity assessment and kind selection, as a rule, are based on expert approach. 
FPGA technology allows developing multi-version systems with different product-process 
version redundancy, diversity scalable multi-tolerant decisions for safety-critical NPP I&Cs. 
Described models of multi-version systems and multi-version technologies (life cycle) may 
support selecting of cost-effective technique and optimal architecture according with 
requirements to diversity, safety, reliability and limitation of applied technologies. These 
theoretical issues were used on development of FPGA-based I&C RADIYTM platform. Main 
peculiarities of the platform are realization of control and other safety-related functions 
without software and ensuring dependability- and diversity-scalable decisions of safety-
critical I&C. Experience of RPC Radiy has proved effectiveness of these decisions. 
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